Fairfield Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs v. Nally, 34 N.E.3d 873 (Ohio 2015) (holding that a new Total Maximum Daily Load for pollutant discharges into a watershed was a rule as defined under the Ohio Administrative Procedure Act and, as such, should have been properly promulgated to afford interested parties their rights to notice and be heard before the rule’s submission to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for approval).

The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, or Clean Water Act, seeks to restore and maintain the integrity of U.S. waters through (i) technology-based effluent limitations on “point sources” discharging pollutants; and (ii) water-quality standards for protecting the use of identified water bodies. The Clean Water Act also requires each state to identify waterways that are too impaired to implement applicable water-quality standards and then rank waterways based on pollution severity. States must then develop a Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL), which establishes a maximum amount of the specified pollutant that may be discharged into the waterway without violating water-quality standards. Once the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) approves a state’s TMDL, the state must implement that TMDL.

Pursuant to these requirements, the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (“Ohio EPA”) developed a document in 2005 called the “Total Maximum Daily Loads for the Big Walnut Creek Watershed” (“TMDL report”), which the EPA subsequently approved. Using stream-survey data from 2000 of Blacklick Creek—one of the 54 “stream segments” in the Big Walnut Creek watershed—the report put forth new phosphorous discharge limits for Blacklick Creek. The Tussing Road Water Reclamation Facility (“Tussing Road plant”), owned by Fairfield County (“the county”), is one of the sources subject to the report’s new limitation. In 2006, the county applied for and received a renewed National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) permit for the Tussing Road plant. The new permit included the TDML-derived phosphorous discharge limitation.

The county appealed this limit to the Environmental Review Appeals Commission (“ERAC”), which found that while the Ohio EPA had a valid basis for imposing the limit, it failed to consider whether such a limit was feasible. Thus, the ERAC vacated the phosphorous limit and remanded the case to the Ohio EPA. Subsequently, the county appealed the ERAC’s finding that the Ohio EPA had a valid foundation for imposing the limit, and the Ohio EPA cross-appealed (asserting that the TMDL had been federally approved and that federal law required Ohio EPA to set the phosphorous limit). The Tenth District Court of Appeals (“lower court”) affirmed the ERAC’s order, finding that there was sufficient factual foundation for a phosphorous limitation and rejecting the county’s assertions that the new limitation lacked meaningful review and, therefore, violated due process. The county appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio (“Court”).

The Court first considered whether the TMDL was a “rule” within the requirements of Chapter 119 of the Ohio Administrative Procedure Act, which defines a “rule” as any “standard, having a general and uniform operation, adopted, promulgated, and enforced by any agency.” Because the TMDL sets a new legal standard—applied by the Ohio EPA—to “all current and future dischargers in the Big Walnut Creek watershed,” the Court observed that the limit fell within Chapter 119’s definition of “rule.” Additionally, the Court disagreed with the agency’s argument that the TMDL is merely a tool for implementing its pre-existing legal obligation. Examining the consequences of a TMDL, the Court determined that even though the Ohio EPA allocated limits individually to different point sources, the same standards and procedures applied to each; thus, the TMDL had “general and uniform effect.” Finally, the Court noted that the TMDL creates new legal obligations. The results of the TMDL development process were new mandatory loading reductions rather than “mere enforcement of compliance with existing authority,” as argued by the Ohio EPA. Thus, the Court held this indicated that the TMDL was indeed a rule subject to rulemaking procedures.

The Court then addressed the county’s second argument—that the TMDL itself establishes a new water-quality standard and therefore requires rulemaking procedures. Previously, the Ohio EPA had promulgated a narrative standard for phosphorous in the Ohio Administrative Code, requiring limitations on phosphorous “to the extent necessary to prevent nuisance growths of algae, weeds, and slimes that result in a violation of water quality criteria.” However, the TMDL imposes a numeric limit for phosphorous for all water bodies in the Big Walnut Creek watershed. The Court found that this new numeric limit constituted a water-quality standard; therefore it should have been first promulgated as a rule under Chapter 119.

Because the TMDL was a rule, the Court held that the Ohio EPA should have complied with Chapter 119’s rulemaking procedures, which include providing public notice, an opportunity for public comment, and a public hearing before using the TMDL-derived target in an NPDES permit. The Court found that while the Ohio EPA did make a draft of the TMDL available for public review before submission to the EPA, that act alone did not satisfy the rulemaking procedural requirements. Because agencies must give the public certain due process rights before a rule attains final federal approval, the Court held that Ohio EPA’s failure to do so ultimately deprived NPDES permit holders of their rights to notice and be heard regarding the rule.

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court’s judgment, vacating the new phosphorous standard and remanding the cause to the Ohio EPA.

Justice O’Donnell concurred as to the ruling, but agreed with the court of appeals’ reasoning. Justice O’Connell observed that the Ohio Administrative Code allows water-quality standards to be either numeric or narrative in nature, and the Ohio EPA had already promulgated the narrative standard for phosphorous limits (quoted above). Because TMDLs merely provide the factual and technological data needed to implement Ohio water-quality standards, Justice O’Donnell argued that TMDLs are not administrative rules and need not be promulgated as such. In O’Donnell’s view, TMDLs are not legal standards, but objective, factual determinations that the Ohio EPA makes to interpret and implement the water-quality standards. Accordingly, Justice O’Donnell would affirm the court’s ruling on the grounds that the Ohio EPA did not challenge the lower court’s determination that the Ohio EPA failed to consider the technical feasibility and economic reasonableness of the limit, rather than the Court’s ruling that the TMDL was a rule.

Katy Rankin

Image: Turtle Pond Panorama, Three Creeks Metro Park, where Big Walnut Creek is joined by its principal tributaries Alum Creek and Blacklick Creek, Columbus Ohio.  Flickr user Raymond Wald, Creative Commons.


“CONFLICTS AND COOPERATION: THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF INTERSTATE WATER COMPACTS”

 

Denver, Colorado                          April 8, 2016

ADDRESSING COMPETING OBLIGATIONS UNDER COMPACTS & THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT

In this panel, Karen Kwon and James “Jay” Tutchton presented differing sides of ongoing conflicts between the federal law and state water compacts concerning the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”).  Kwon, from the Office of the Colorado Attorney General, works in water compact litigation and negotiations.  She has contributed to two amicus briefs submitted to the Supreme Court of the United States regarding state compact issues.  Tutchton has been a public interest environmental attorney for over twenty years, and he is currently a Senior Staff Attorney with the Defenders of Wildlife.  Federico Cheever, an environmental law professor at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law who has written about the ESA, moderated the panel.

First, Kwon offered her approach to this conflict.  She began with a brief recitation of the implications the ESA has among interstate relations.  For instance, the ESA affects water and wildlife management between states because endangered species recovery in one state can affect water supplies in other areas.  Additionally, the ESA implicates the allocation and use of compact water.  Recovery of underwater species under the ESA often requires reserving a steady water supply for recuperation efforts.

 

Then, Ms. Kwon focused on the state perspective of this competition and described several values that Coloradans hold.  First, Coloradans value their environment.  Conserving and promoting species promotes that way of life.  Second, that quality of life requires a certain availability in water supply.  Attaining a reliable supply of water helps to preserve species and further Coloradans’ way of life.  Finally, Coloradans seek to maintain their ability to manage the resources within their borders.

Kwon next analyzed the ESA and discussed its advantages and disadvantages.  One of its advantages is that lawyers can use it as a tool to effectuate change.  Through litigation, lawyers can try to modify or stop projects that jeopardize endangered species.  Another point in the law’s favor, the ESA protections have proven successful in preventing extinction.  On the other hand, the ESA’s disadvantages include the fact that very few species have recovered to the point that they can leave the endangered species list.  Also, some view the ESA as a threat instead of a tool because the ESA threatens liability for those who do not adhere to its guidelines.  Finally, the ESA contains no long-term incentives looking to the future.  Instead, it focuses on present happenings and immediate incentives.

Before posing her solution, Kwon presented two examples in Colorado of conflicts between the ESA and compacts: the Delta Smelt in the Bay Delta and the Silvery Minnow in the Rio Grande.  The Delta Smelt conflict could dramatically cut the amount of water flowing to Southern California and directly affect the Colorado River.  The Silvery Minnow conflict involves a dwindling fish population in the Rio Grande River, which divides several states’ waters.

Kwon’s proposed solution to this problem is as follows: fit species conservation within the existing structure of water allocation in and between states.  Through this framework, states can create long-term goals and accomplish them while working within the ESA’s parameters.  Additionally, states may find flexibilities under the ESA to allow compliance with water compacts while recovering species.  Kwon then offered several examples from Colorado that embody this solution.  First, a Colorado policy, the Colorado Parks and Wildlife and the Colorado Water Conservation Board (“CWCB”) work to “keep species common” and to recover and de-list already-endangered species.  To do this, the two entities collaborate with public and private groups to collect, exchange, and analyze data and resources on endangered species.  Overall, they use this data to collaborate and try to intervene before listing species as endangered.

Another example illustrating Kwon’s proposed solution concerns the Upper Colorado Recovery Program.  In this program, several public and private entities collaborate to recover four endangered species of fish in the Upper Colorado River without interfering with water rights or compacts.  The program avoids this interference by implementing flow augmentation, monitoring non-native fish, screening large diversions, and constructing fish ladders to help habitat access.  Through these actions, the program maintains compliance with the ESA while promoting the recovery of several endangered fish.  Kwon also mentioned a third example: a water lease in the 15-Mile Reach in Colorado.  Through this action, the CWCB leases approximately twelve thousand acre-feet to preserve the natural environment flows in that area and maintain the goals of the parties involved, such as water use and development.

Kwon summarized by re-emphasizing that the challenges facing species are growing, such as a lack of both long-term solutions and scientific consensus.  In order to combat these challenges, she stressed that water advocates must collaborate and utilize scientific methods.

Tutchton took the podium next, and he started by explaining that the ESA’s process, like a play, consists of “acts.”  In the first “act,” the ESA prescribes the requirements for listing a species as endangered. Researchers utilize the best available science to determine whether extinction poses a danger to a species or a distinct population segment of vertebrate.  The second “act” includes the consultation process, during which the government re-thinks its activities in light of the listing.  This portion prohibits the federal government from making the species’ situation worse.  Finally, the third “act” prohibits anyone from “taking” the endangered species.  In this context, both killing a member of the species and destroying its habitat constitutes a “taking.”

According to Tutchton, the ESA is a paper tiger.  That is, it looks tough, but lawyers may easily disarm it.  In practice, the ESA only removes or modifies the worst-of-the-worst projects.  In the water world, however, Tutchton concedes that the ESA commonly helps water species gain protection and escape extinction.  He attributes this characteristic to the fact-heavy situations and objective, scientific determination. An apparent advantage for water wildlife is that researchers can collect data to calculate with scientific precision the results of a particular action, and thus protect endangered water species from peril.  For example, Tutchton mentioned one case where the predicted extinction of a three-inch fish overruled the construction of a dam.  In that case, researchers produced enough data to conclude the species would become extinct if developers built the dam and blocked its construction.

Next, Tutchton briefly mentioned that one can comply with both of the laws of the river, and then quickly turned to the success of the ESA.  For instance, while the government has de-listed relatively few species, the ESA’s regulations have seen success in perpetuating the survival of listed species.  Going against those that criticize the ESA for a lack of de-listing, Tutchton admitted the ability of the species to recover depends on the means one wants to use.  Certainly more drastic measures can get faster results, but those drastic measures may venture beyond one’s comfort zone.  In practice, the small measures produce small effects, often resulting in maintenance or slow growth of a species.

Additionally, while Tutchton understands the desire for local control, he argued several counterpoints.  First, all species, as national resources, are of national interest.  All people, no matter where they live, have an equal right to enjoy the nation’s wildlife.  Furthermore, the need to list a species represents a local failure of conservation.  The federal government does not manage wildlife until after listing occurs.  Then, the federal government steps in to intervene for the endangered species.  Finally, Tutchton admitted that handing control back to the state, which often caused the endangered status, disappoints him.

Then, Tutchton touched on the issue of drought.  He declared that Westerners routinely live in a drought.  In fact, he hopes people in Colorado and the West more generally remove the word “drought” from their vocabularies, as these areas normally experience little or no precipitation.  Furthermore, Westerners should consider rain or snow an abnormality, especially in states located in a former dust bowl.  Thus, organizations should expect drought-like weather and act in accordance with the expected conditions.

Finally, Tutchton spoke about the future of the ESA.  First, he pointed out the ESA underrepresents real life.  The ESA currently protects fifteen-hundred species, but scientists speculate that number should be around six or eight thousand.  Next, he mentioned that species originally evolved before humans changed the earth’s landscape.  Wildlife originally developed when rivers regularly flooded and followed their natural course.  Now, humans use rivers for transportation and for development.  Creating and managing the workarounds needed to protect the species will only present more difficulty as human development continues. Tutchton summarized by emphasizing that he favors ESA litigation, as it helps to represent underrepresented points of view in critical ventures.

            Connor Pace


The Water Law Review would like to congratulate our new Staff Editors for their excellent work on the Fall 2016 Candidacy Packet.  Welcome to the Water Law Review!


Gia Austin
Margaret Casey
Jeremy Frankel
Alicia Garcia
Kelsey Holder
Ryan Hull
Nathaniel Rioux Jordan
Dalton Kelley
Kole Kelley
Trevor Lambirth
Erica Montague
Travis Parker
Lindsay A. Ratcliff
Gracen Short
Rebecca Spence
Tina Xu


 


Alaska Wilderness League v. Jewell, 788 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirming the district court’s ruling that: (i) the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement’s approval of the challenged oil spill response plans was not arbitrary and capricious; (ii) the Endangered Species Act did not require the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement to consult with any environmental agencies before approving oil spill response plans; (iii) the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement was entitled to Chevron deference for its interpretation of the Oil Pollution Act; and (iv) the National Environmental Policy Act did not require the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement to do an environmental impact statement before approving an oil spill response plan).

The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”) outlines the procedure for exploration and development of oil and gas resources offshore. This process has four stages. First, the Secretary of Interior creates a five-year leasing program under which operators may search and mine for oil and gas. Second, the Secretary must approve the leases under agreed upon terms and conditions. Third, the lessee must provide the Secretary with a plan of exploration and an Oil Spill Response Plan (“OSRP”) pursuant to the Clean Water Act (“CWA”). Fourth, after searching for oil and gas, and successfully finding either, the lessee has must submit a production and development plan to the Secretary for approval.

At the third stage, the Secretary of the Interior has delegated its power to the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (“BSEE”) to approve OSRPs to prevent and respond to oil spills. The CWA requires these plans at four levels: national, regional, local, and individual. At the individual level, owners and operators must propose an OSRP for approval that outlines their response to a potential “worst case discharge” of oil or some other hazardous substance.

Shell Gulf of Mexico Inc. and Shell Offshore Inc. (collectively “Shell”) acquired three leases for offshore exploration and production—two leases in the Beaufort in 2005 and 2007, and one in the Chukchi Seas in 2008. Shell complied with all regulations at the time for intended exploration, but due to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010, the Secretary of the Interior placed a temporary moratorium on all offshore drilling. The United States Department of Interior required owners and operators to provide new information in all OSRPs after the moratorium ended. To comply with the new criteria, Shell updated its OSRPs for its three leases. BSEE approved the updated Beaufort and Chukchi Seas OSRPs.

Alaska Wilderness League, a coalition of environmental groups, sued Secretary of Interior, Sally Jewell, in her official capacity because of the approval of Shell’s three OSRPs. Shell intervened as a co-defendant. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the United States District Court for the District of Alaska (“district court”) ruled in favor of Jewell and Shell. Alaska Wilderness League appealed to the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit (“Court”). The Court reviewed the granting of summary judgment de novo and reviewed the record of the agency’s action under the arbitrary and capricious standard.

First, Alaska Wilderness League argued BSEE’s approval of the OSRPs was arbitrary and capricious because Shell assumed it would be able to recover ninety to ninety-five percent of any oil spilled in either of the seas via mechanical means. A figure that Alaska Wilderness League claimed was unrealistic and that Shell failed to support with any evidence. The Court did not agree with Alaska Wilderness League’s interpretation, finding instead that Shell could store, not recover, ninety to ninety-five percent of any spilled oil. Further, the Court found that BSEE did not rely on this information in approving Shell’s OSRPs. Therefore, the Court found that the record did not support Alaska Wilderness League’s argument. Accordingly, the Court concluded BSEE’s approval of the OSRPs was not arbitrary and capricious.

The Court next addressed Alaska Wilderness League’s argument that BSEE failed to consult with other agencies in order to comply with the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”). The Court disagreed. The Court reasoned that ESA only triggers consultation when the agency’s involvement is discretionary, and, in this case, BSEE’s approval of the OSRPs was non-discretionary. Therefore, the Court held that ESA did not require BSEE to do a consultation.

The Court then went through a two-step Chevron deference analysis to assess BSEE’s interpretation of the applicable sections of the CWA. At step one of its Chevron analysis, whether the statute in question is ambiguous, the Court found that the CWA was ambiguous in both its structure and its language. The Court found the CWA has ambiguous language because of three pertinent sections: (i) 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5)(A)(i) requires an operator to “prepare and submit . . . a plan for responding, to the maximum extent practicable, to a worst case discharge;” (ii) § 1321(j)(5)(D) lists six requirements that the OSRP “shall” meet; and (iii) § 1321(j)(5)(E)(iii) states that if the OSRP meets all six requirements, then BSEE “shall” approve it.

Specifically, the Court found the text ambiguous as to whether BSEE has the discretion to consider any additional environmental factors in making its determination of an OSRP. The Court found that the “maximum extent practicable” language in § 1321(j)(5)(A)(i) suggested the agency had discretion in its approval of an OSRP. However, the Court also found §§ 1321(j)(5)(D) and 1321(j)(5)(E)(iii) to be a laundry list of requirements that an OSRP must meet. If an OSRP meets those requirements, then BSEE must approve the plan; removing any agency discretion. Additionally, the Court found the statute’s structure ambiguous because of the discretionary language in one section, and the rigid language in the one following it. The Court found this difference created “a statute whose halves do not correspond to each other – giving rise to ambiguity that calls for Chevron deference.” Under this finding of ambiguity, the Court found it must defer to BSEE’s interpretation of the statute as long as its interpretation is reasonable.

The Court then underwent the second step of the Chevron analysis to determine whether BSEE’s interpretation was reasonable. Courts must defer to an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute as long as that interpretation is reasonable. The Court found that BSEE’s interpretation of the statute was reasonable. BSEE argued that § 1321(j)(5)(A)(i) mandated it to promulgate regulations that help operators follow the OSRP requirements listed in § 1321(j)(5)(D). Then, separately, § 1321(j)(5)(D)-(E) lists exactly what the OSRP shall include and the agency shall approve. The Court agreed with BSEE’s interpretation that the statute mandated the agency to publish regulations to outline how operators can comply with the list. The Court also agreed with BSEE’s interpretation that it could not consider anything more than the list when granting an OSRP. The Court, having found BSEE’s interpretation to be reasonable, deferred to the agency’s interpretation.

The Court also found that BSEE’s interpretation was consistent with longstanding agency policy. The Court explained how BSEE has a history of regulating in conformity with the goals of the Oil Pollution Act that amended the CWA. The legislative history of the Oil Pollution Act suggests that Congress meant to create specific requirements of OSRPs, not guidelines open to interpretation by the courts or agencies.

Lastly, the Court addressed Alaska Wilderness League’s four additional arguments. First, Alaska Wilderness League argued that the similarity in language between the requirements listed in § 1321(j)(5)(E) and the section of the statute governing federal response plans to spills subjected the approval of OSRPs to ESA consultation. However, the Court disagreed with this interpretation. Under the sections of the statute governing federal response plans, an ESA recommendation may prompt agency action, but the plan “shall include, but not be limited to” a number of factors. This federal response plan requirement, unlike that in § 1321(j)(5)(E), does not limit the factors to those listed.

Second, Alaska Wilderness League argued that the regulations contain no language to support approval of the OSRPs just because they address the clean up plan to some degree. The Court quickly dismissed this argument. The Court found that the statute states that the purpose of the OSRP is to prepare a response plan for an accident at sea resulting in release of oil, and that Congress ordered these plans be in compliance with “the Oil Pollution Act’s amendments to the Clean Water Act.” The Court deferred to BSEE’s interpretation that the OSRPs were sufficient and justly approved, despite any explicit language governing BSEE’s decision.

Third, Alaska Wilderness League argued that BSEE had discretion over whether OSRPs met the criteria in § 1321(j)(5)(E), thus triggering ESA consultation. The Court found this argument to be at odds with previous Supreme Court’s rulings. The Supreme Court previously held that “ESA cannot defeat an agency’s nondiscretionary statutory directive.” The Court held that BSEE’s act of granting OSRPs was nondiscretionary, and so it did not trigger any interagency review under ESA.

Lastly, Alaska Wilderness League claimed that BSEE violated the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) by failing to do an environmental impact statement (“EIS”) before approving the OSRPs. Under NEPA, all federal agencies must conduct an EIS before conducting any “major Federal action” that significantly affects the environment. However, the Court noted that there is an exception to this requirement when the environmental impact is the result of a decision over which the agency had no discretion. The Court ruled that because BSEE had no discretion over the approval of the OSRPs under the statute, it also had no discretion over the environmental impacts, making BSEE exempt from performing an EIS.

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court’s ruling.

D.W. Nelson, Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting.

Senior Circuit Judge Nelson agreed with the majority’s ruling that BSEE acted appropriately when it approved the OSRPs in question, but dissented to all other aspects of the majority opinion. Specifically, the dissent agreed with Alaska Wilderness League’s contention that BSEE’s action was discretionary, triggering an ESA consultation.

The dissent also disagreed with the majority’s finding that BSEE was exempt from performing a NEPA analysis. The dissent did not agree with the majority’s interpretation of the NEPA exception. The dissent argued that as a regulator of environmental consequences “the [BSEE] did in fact possess the kind of discretion that necessitated NEPA review.”

William James Tilton

Image: Deepwater Horizon oil spill, Gulf of Mexico. Flickr user Green Fire Productions, Creative Commons.


“CONFLICTS AND COOPERATION: THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF INTERSTATE WATER COMPACTS”

Denver, Colorado                          April 8, 2016

COLORADO RIVER COMPACT ISSUES AFFECTING THE NAVAJO WATER PROJECTS

At the University of Denver Water Law Review’s Annual Symposium, Assistant Attorney General and member of the Water Rights Unit of the Navajo Nation Department of Justice (“NNDOJ”), Stanley Pollack, spoke about issues and challenges the Colorado River Compact pose to the Navajo Nation’s water projects.  The mission of NNDOJ’s Water Rights Unit is to protect the water rights of the Navajo Nation.  The NNDOJ, as the Navajo Nation’s representative in state and federal litigation, is currently pursuing five general stream adjudications.

Pollack prefaced his presentation by focusing on various Colorado River issues and how interstate compacts put different restraints on Navajo water development, particularly in the context of drinking water projects.  Pollack emphasized the need to provide drinking water to the Navajo Nation.  Pollack pointed out that thirty to forty percent of the Navajo physically haul their drinking water in barrels.  Pollack illustrated this point with a picture drawn by an elementary school student from Lake Valley, New Mexico.  The picture was one of many drawings elementary school children submitted during the Navajo Gallup Water Supply Project (“Supply Project”) hearings.  The drawings were supposed to depict what water meant to the children and the importance of water.  The drawing Pollack showed was of a pick-up truck with two large barrels with the word “water” written on them in the truck’s bed.  This drawing demonstrated that there were generations of children within the boundaries of the Navajo Nation that do not think drinking water is something that comes out of a faucet, but from a barrel in the back of a truck.

Pollack then asked the audience to imagine themselves as members of the Navajo before the explorative efforts of the Europeans.  He showed aerial maps of what the Navajo Nation used to be in contrast to what it became after European migration and the establishment of the United States.  The Navajo called their homeland Dinétah, and it encompasses the land between the Four Sacred Mountains: Mount Blanca, in Southern Colorado; Mount Taylor, in New Mexico; San Francisco Peak, in Arizona; and Mount Hesperus, in Colorado.  What becomes evident, said Pollack, is that this is high desert country, subject to a dry and arid climate with little development.  He emphasized that the Navajo had been thriving in this area for hundreds of years, until the day when foreign people came along and began drawing boundaries on the land.

 

The first boundary was the establishment of the Navajo Reservation.  The reservation greatly reduced the land that the Navajo called home.  Next, state boundaries began forming and the Navajo saw the U.S. government parcel up its homeland, subjecting them to boundary lines the Navajo had no say in forming.  Then, in 1922, the Navajo saw the U.S. government divide the Colorado River Basin into an upper and lower basin.  Pollack explained that, once again, the United States subjected the Navajo to boundaries they had no say in forming, but must abide.  Pollack noted that with each boundary line came new political constraints on the Navajo.  The boundaries told the Navajo where they could and could not live and what they could and could not do on the land.  These restrictions imposed limits on what the Navajo could do with their water, and that, Pollack said, is what he wanted to discuss.

Pollack quoted the language of Article VII of the Colorado River Compact: “nothing in this compact shall be construed as affecting the obligation of the United States to the Indian tribes.”  He said that by this language, the rules and boundaries on the map should not apply to the tribes.  However, in reality, this is not the case.  The Navajo finds themselves almost entirely in the Colorado River Basin—upper and lower—and within the three states of Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah.  The geography of the Navajo Nation, Pollack said, makes it difficult to protect the water rights of the Navajo because there are so many entities at play, each with its own rules, regulations, and characteristics.

Pollack then rhetorically asked why, if the language of the compact really meant what it said, is providing water to the Navajo such a problem.  He answered this by saying that, as an attorney for the NNDOJ, he can litigate and litigate, but at the end of the day, only Congress has the power to authorize a water development plan for the tribes.  Therefore, Congress will use that power as it sees fit, and, ultimately, litigation is a “hollow exercise.”  Litigation yields merely paper water rights, and the people Pollack represents cannot drink water from the paper he might obtain in litigation.  Consequently, when the Navajo want to develop their water, they must go to Congress and request the funding necessary for that project.  In doing so, they have to make sure that what they want to do fits within the political systems in place.  Pollack explained that the Colorado River Basin is not just about where the watersheds are on a map or the water within the system, but rather the areas that can receive water because of the Colorado River System.

Pollack next discussed how the upper basin is composed of the parts of the upper-basin-states Lee Ferry serves.  Lee Ferry is the dividing point between the upper and lower basins.  The lower basin is composed of those parts of the states without the drainage of the Colorado River system.  This means any part of a state, whether in the upper or lower basin, is really part of the upper basin if water from the upper basin can serve it.

The only parts of New Mexico considered part of the Colorado River Basin are in the lower basin, Pollack said.  He then displayed a map and pointed out the Navajo Nation, the San Juan River Basin, and the New Mexico Water Rights Settlement.  The centerpiece of the New Mexico settlement, Pollack said, is the Supply Project.  He explained that there are two pipelines coming from the San Juan River that serve communities in the upper basin and lower basin in New Mexico, the Rio Grande area, and Arizona.  Pollack noted that this creates four different communities needing water delivery.  Delivering water from the San Juan River to communities in the upper basin of New Mexico requires little transportation because the communities use water from the upper basin.  Pollack further explained that the geographical location of the upper basin makes sending water to the Rio Grande very simple, but sending water to the lower basin more difficult because the lower basin has the drainage of the Colorado River System.

It is as odd paradox, Pollack continued, that the rules essentially encourage an out-of-basin use of water by sending water to the Rio Grande where there is no return flow to the Colorado River.  While, at the same time, the rules are set up against using water in the lower basin where there is the drainage of the Colorado River System because the waters below Lee Ferry can serve the lower basin.  However, in 2003, Pollack went to the Upper Colorado River Commission and persuaded the body to allow the Supply Project to deliver water from the upper basin to the lower basin, provided that the Supply Project consider the water use as an upper basin use.  What is important about this, Pollack said, is that the states can work together to find solutions to interstate problems even though the laws of the river on their face do not allow for such actions.

Pollack concluded his speech by introducing a pipeline project that he said is still “a pipe dream.”  The project, called the Western Navajo Pipeline, would deliver water to the Western portion of the Navajo Nation.  Pollack explained that the Western portion of the Navajo Nation is an area to which it is particularly difficult to get water because there are no sources of ground or surface water apart from the Colorado River.  This forces most Navajo to haul their water.  Pollack asserted that because it is so hard to get water from the Colorado River in the Grand Canyon, the Navajo should get water from Lake Powell.  Therefore, he proposed to pump water from Lake Powell above the basin, and then pump it down into the Western Navajo area.  Pollack thinks that the precedent set from the New Mexico settlement, as well as the Upper Basin Resolution from 2003, should allow this pipeline pipe dream to become a reality.

Tucker Allen


Askins v. Ohio Dep’t of Agric., 809 F.3d 868 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that i) the Clean Water Act’s citizen suit provision does not apply to notification requirements; ii) the Clean Water Act’s notification requirement is not a condition of a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit; iii) the Clean Water Act does not permit a cause of action against non-polluting regulators for violations of procedural regulations; and iv) the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s decision not to hold a hearing was not a failure to perform a non-discretionary duty, and as such was not actionable under the Clean Water Act).

This was an appeal from The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, which dismissed all of appellants’, Larry and Vickie Askins (“Askinses”), claims.  The Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (“Ohio EPA”) administers the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) under the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (“U.S. EPA”) approval.  In 2001, the Ohio legislature authorized the Ohio Department of Agriculture (“ODA”) to apply to the U.S. EPA to transfer authority from Ohio EPA to ODA, so that ODA could administer part of the state-NPDES program.  The Clean Water Act (“CWA”) permits such a transfer, but requires the U.S. EPA’s permission prior to transfer.  The Askinses alleged that the transfer took place in 2001, while the Ohio EPA didn’t seek permission until some five years later.  As such, the Askinses sued under the CWA’s citizen suit provision, alleging various violations of the CWA.

The lower court held that the Askinses failed to state a claim under the CWA, the U.S. EPA did not fail to perform a non-discretionary duty under the CWA, and the U.S. EPA, the Ohio EPA, and the ODA did not violate the CWA.  The Askinses appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals (“Court”), arguing that the CWA’s citizen suit provision permitted their cause of action.

First, the Court considered whether the Askinses could maintain a citizen suit action for a violation of the CWA’s notice requirement under Section 1314.  The Court reasoned that the notice requirement at issue is not an enumerated provision requiring compliance, and as such, the citizen suit provision does not encompass alleged violations of the requirement.

Next, the Court considered whether the notification requirement was a “condition.”  The Court concluded that the notification requirement serves as a timing mechanism, which triggers a state’s ability to apply to administer the NPDES program, as opposed to a substantive requirement.  Further, the notification requirement referred to EPA approval of a state’s permit program, not a state’s approval of individual permits.  Finally, the Court concluded that the Askinses’ reading of the notification requirement as a condition was contradictory to NPDES requirements, specifically that state and federal permit conditions be the same.  As such, the Court held that the CWA’s notification requirement is not a permit “condition.”

Third, the Court determined whether there existed a private cause of action against regulators for violations of procedural regulations.  The Court concluded that if Congress intended the citizen suit provision to permit the Askinses’ claim, it would have included language in the explicitly enumerated circumstances permitting suit.  Further, if the citizen suit provision were so expansive as to permit this claim, the provision’s remedies would give it more teeth than the U.S. EPA itself has, by way of the provision’s shorter notice period and availability of civil penalties and costs.  This is not the case because Congress intended the citizen suit provision to supplement the regulators’ authority.  Finally, cases that considered other, identical citizen suit provisions reached the same conclusion as this Court.  Therefore, the Court held, the CWA citizen suit provision did not permit a private right of action against a non-polluting regulator for procedural violations.

Finally, the Court considered whether the U.S. EPA failed to perform a non-discretionary duty.  The Court held that the CWA does not require the U.S. EPA to hold a hearing.  Should the U.S. EPA choose to hold a hearing, the CWA requires it to withdraw approval of a state-NPDES program after hearing, proper notice, and time to address the issue.  That is to say, the CWA does not require a hearing in the first place; therefore it is not a non-discretionary duty.  The U.S. EPA did not hold a hearing in the present case, so no non-discretionary duties arose.  Thus, the CWA did not permit the Askinses’ citizen suit.

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court’s dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Tim Berrier


“CONFLICTS AND COOPERATION: THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF INTERSTATE WATER COMPACTS”

Denver, Colorado                          April 8, 2016

THE COLORADO RIVER SYSTEM:  PERSPECTIVES FROM THE LOWER BASIN

Ted Kowalski, Chief of the Interstate, Federal & Water Information Section of the Colorado Water Conservation Board, moderated a panel at the University of Denver Water Law Review Annual Symposium featuring three speakers addressing different perspectives from the Lower Basin.

The first speaker was Bill Hasencamp, Manager of Colorado River Resources, Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (“MWD”).  Hasencamp represented the municipal provider perspective on the panel.  MWD covers a one trillion dollar economy, 5,200 square mile service area, and—as one of the largest water providers in the country— approximately nineteen million residents.  Hasencamp explained how the drought in the 1990s forced Southern California to rethink the way it rationed water.  In response to the drought, Southern California devised an integrated resource plan for meeting reliability needs of the region.  The plan focused on agricultural to urban transfers and augmenting the dry year water supply with storage.  According to Hasencamp, the plan was effective, but maintaining the water supply has been a challenge for several reasons.

One challenge has been the geography of the delta between Northern and Southern California.  According to Hasencamp, the state water project receives water from the Sacramento River that comes into the delta from the North.  The pumps for both the state water and central valley project are both in the South.  Therefore, in order for the water to move between Northern and Southern California, it must move through the delta.  Unfortunately, fish swim too close to the pump and, in order to protect them, state and federal environmental regulations have forced Southern California to reduce pumping with increasing frequency.  Hasencamp explained that this year alone, during the worst drought in California’s history, California lost nearly a million acre-feet of water because fish were swimming too close to the intake.  In addition to fisheries, other long-term risks on the delta include seismic concerns with the bay area fault, as well as rising seal levels.  Hasencamp warned that if catastrophe hit, the delta could become an inland sea, and that this might prohibit the pumping of water for years.

Hasencamp then asserted that the focus needs to be on getting the delta functioning again in a way that will protect the environment and meet the water needs of the state.  Hasencamp explained that MWD believes the way to do that is through tunnels under the delta.  With tunnels, if a catastrophe occurred and the delta failed, Southern California would not lose pumping as the state could still receive water from the river upstream.  Tunnels would also ensure that Southern California could obtain water in a way that protects fish from pumps.  The plan is currently up for approval and Hasencamp is hopeful that it will pass.

Another challenge for California has been the apportionment on the Colorado River.  Hasencamp explained that a series of compacts and agreements give each state a certain allocation of the Colorado River.  After fifty years, California saw a dramatic reduction in its apportionments under the Colorado River Compact.  As a result, the state had to develop a plan to limit water intake in order to live within the reduced allocation.  In response, California developed a plan with other states to keep the Colorado River Aqueduct full until the year 2016.  Through the combination of special surplus water and agricultural to urban transfers, the aqueduct would theoretically have stayed full until 2016.  However, Hasencamp described a catch in the plan: Lake Mead had to remain at least two-thirds full.  Unfortunately, as he explained, MWD did not anticipate the worst drought in the history of the Colorado Basin.  As a result, Southern California did not receive the anticipated water from the river and instead had to shift its focus locally toward developing recycling, desalination, groundwater recovery, and conservation plans.  Hasencamp briefly discussed some of these plans including implementing agricultural conservation measures with Imperial Irrigation District (“IID”) to grow the same crops with less water; lining the American and Coachella canals; developing programs to incentivize farmers not to grow crops; entering a water sharing agreement with Nevada; and developing the Lake Mead Storage Program.  Hasencamp explained that even as the drought in California continues, extra water does exist.  Unfortunately, California cannot pump the water so they are still receiving drought allocations.  In conclusion, he suggested that fixing the delta would help to alleviate this tension.

The second speaker was Chuck Cullom, Manager of Colorado River Programs, Central Arizona Project (“CAP”).  He represented an agricultural and urban perspective.  To begin, Cullom gave a brief overview of the Colorado River System describing it as “the engine of the west.”  While not even in the top twenty largest rivers in North America, the Colorado has four times the annual run-off in storage capacity.  CAP delivers water to four million people in Arizona, provides water for cities and irrigation, and has the most diverse customer classes in the Colorado River system, serving eleven tribes, ten irrigation districts, and ten cities.

Like Hasencamp, Cullom emphasized the steady decline in Lake Mead and the implications it had for CAP.  Currently, the Lower Basin runs at a deficit of about 1.2 million acre-feet every year.  In accordance with the compact, MWD and California have invested billions to reduce their water use from 5.1 to 4.4 million acre-feet, and, still, Lake Mead is declining.  The decline undermines the effectiveness of these cooperative agreements.  Cullom explained that from CAP’s perspective, it must bear the burden of this shortage from what, it believes, is a shared obligation.  The Colorado River system is a linked system of seven states in the Lower Basin.  As the reservoir declines, the reductions grow.  When Lake Mead evaporates, apportionments do not factor in that reduction.  But through cooperative agreements, states have been able to define what shortages will look like in the Lower Basin.

During the first anticipated shortage, Cullom clarified that CAP’s underground water storage will diminish and agriculture customers could be cut by more than half.  In light of the persistent long term risk of shortage, CAP has developed several responses.  First, it has invested millions into storing water underground to protect users from shortages.  Second, like MWD and IID partners in California, CAP has begun storing water in Lake Mead to prop the reservoir up in order to avoid immediate shortage issues and reduce the risk of long-term shortage issues.  CAP has reduced annual diversion by between 140,000-180,000 acre-feet.  By the end of this year, CAP will have stored 345,000 acre-feet in Lake Mead.

Cullom concluded by emphasizing that the structural deficit creates a long-term risk to all Lower Basin Colorado River users and undermines the ability to become cooperative and collaborative partners.  CAP is attempting to follow the lead of California in developing proactive steps to reduce its use, but also is looking to collaborate and cooperate with Lower Basin partners to assist and share in those additional reductions.

The final speaker was Kevin Kelly, General Manager of IID.  He represented the irrigation perspective in a district with the largest number of agricultural to urban transfers in the nation.  According to Kelly, because California has been exceeding its 4.4 million acre-foot entitlement to the Colorado River, IID entered into transfer agreements to bring California “back in line.”  As Kelly explained though, “the only dangling question mark is the Salton Sea.”

According to Kelly, Imperial Valley is an economically-challenged community with 450,000 acres in active cultivation.  Because of the vast farmland and economic nature of the community, the recession of the Salton Sea will have devastating impact on the Imperial Valley.  When the Salton Sea issue first arose, the state of California took responsibility for handling it, focusing primarily on restoration.  However, as Kelly explained, California failed to fulfill its responsibility.  In 2014, in order to bring this issue to the forefront, IID filed a petition with its own state water board.  It informed California of its failure to meet the task of tackling the Salton Sea problem and requested the state board resolve the Salton Seat question as a condition of the transfers.

By the year 2047, 74,000 acres of lakebed will lay exposed, and the water elevation will be negative 249,090 feet.  To address the issue, IID suggests filling up the lakebed with habitat and renewable energy projects.  Kelly argued that renewable energy projects would be especially effective because the same exposed lakebed in the Salton Sea happens to correspond with this hemisphere’s largest untapped geothermal resource.  Kelly asserted that this resource could replace the lost generation at the San Onofre nuclear plant.  Yet, unlike the plant, the Salton Sea would have virtually no emissions.

Kelly noted that California has the most aggressive renewable portfolio standard in the nation as well as the most ambitious greenhouse gas reduction bills.  But in the last four years since San Onofre went down, air in California has become markedly more polluted.  According to Kelly, geothermal energy should be an integral part of the solution to filling up the exposed lakebed.  Kelly argued that IID could not enter another quantification settlement agreement when it is struggling to implement the first one.  At the end of his speech, he posed a rhetorical question: When you pit agriculture against all the other uses in California, who decides whose economic project is more important?  Kelly answered: “In a diversified economy in the southwest, agriculture needs to count for something.”

Neillie Fields